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Leadership in World Society:  
Power and Change from the Perspective of Sociological 
Institutionalism  
 
Anja P. Jakobi 
Introduction 
Nowadays, constructivism forms one of three grand theories of international relations (IR) 
scholarship. At the heart of this theory is sociological institutionalism, which has become 
particularly important in research on norms and legitimacy. As such, it has contributed to an 
enhanced understanding of how international organizations influence states, or why identities and 
culture are important (Finnemore 1993; Katzenstein 1996). However, given the usual focus on 
norms, sociological institutionalism is often not perceived as a real challenge to realist or 
rationalist theories that put power and interests at the center of their explanations. Despite a 
significant different ontological base (see Risse 2002: 599-600), sociological institutionalism forms 
a complementary approach that puts forward explanations for phenomena that are hard to grasp 
with a realist focus on power or a rationalist focus on interests (see, for instance, critique by 
Drezner 2007).  
This paper will take a different route. It aims to enlarge the framework of sociological 
institutionalism by also covering issues that are usually left out of its analytical focus, specifically 
power and change.1 Sociological institutionalism is a highly developed framework in sociology and 
encompasses a breadth of arguments that are currently widely overlooked by scholars in IR, who 
thus miss an opportunity to test new explanations in key areas of interest to the discipline. Most 
importantly, norm-related research is actually only one aspect of sociological institutionalism, and 
other pillars in this theoretical tradition underline very different aspects. By conceptualizing power 
and change in this theoretical framework, I aim to show that this tradition can provide an 
important alternative to standard realist and rationalist theories in core fields of their application. 
The paper thus delivers a more nuanced picture of sociological institutionalism, and at the same 
time, it opens up an array of further research on international politics. This is important given that 
political activities in current global governance reflect different and complex political maneuvers, 
ranging from hard to soft governance, and including the orchestration of state and non-state actors 
(Abbott et al. 2010). The idea of world society corresponds well to this complexity, but 
conceptualization of change and power is still required in this framework. However, the theoretical 
focus on structures and outcomes, but not on actors, is an important reason why sociological 
institutionalism has been applied only partially in IR.  
To overcome these limitations, this paper lays out a theoretical framework to explain the rise of 
regulations, norms or global governance efforts, as well as the change brought with them. I first 
present the development of sociological institutionalism, in particular its roots in organizational 
analyses and its understanding of world politics. In a second step, I then turn to a specific concept 
of power and change in world society, derived from approaches of institutional entrepreneurship 
in organizational studies. As the section shows, it is possible to conceptualize these issues in 
institutional terms, resulting in a widely relational concept, considering specific interactions with 
other, less powerful actors. In the third step, I provide an empirical case study on institutional 
entrepreneurship, namely the United States and the field of global crime governance. In the final 
section I identify several research areas that could build upon an enlarged concept of world society 
                                                 
 
1  The paper is derived from work presented in Jakobi (2011). 
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and sociological institutionalism. I particularly outline the potential for research on global political 
change, governmental strategies for change and the linkage to diffusion. 
Throughout the paper, I refer to ‘sociological institutionalism’ as the body of thought that, for 
example, Finnemore or Hall/Taylor presented in earlier work (Finnemore 1996; Hall/Taylor 1996). 
However, from the very perspective of the theorists concerned, this is not necessarily the most 
appropriate label, given that there are different institutionalists in sociology, and that those labeled 
‘sociological institutionalists’ in political science are usually considered to be the ‘new 
institutionalists’ in sociology (Powell/DiMaggio 1992). Moreover, there is considerable variation 
among these institutionalists with regard to main explanatory models, the role of actors and many 
more aspects (see Meyer 2009; Scott 2008). Besides, scholars in organization theory have begun to 
define themselves as ‘organizational institutionalist’ (Greenwood et al. 2008: 1). While these terms 
all denote a strong variety of institutional approaches, I stick to the label of ‘sociological 
institutionalism’ here, since it has become widely established in IR research, but, as we shall see 
below, at the cost of lessening the distinctive character of specific discussions therein. By ‘world 
society theory’, I refer to a specific strand of research that developed in this framework, and which 
explains worldwide political and social change (compare Drori/Krücken 2009; Meyer et al. 1997a). 
In sum, incorporating political leadership to the idea of world society adds an important element 
for explaining change in world society. From such perspective, world politics is a relational 
struggle for leadership and the diffusion of common ideas and regulations that are in line with 
those ideas favored by the leaders. This is closely related to many other approaches in IR, but 
entails a strong relational component and also conceives power as being linked primarily to a 
specific issue area.  
The Background of Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism can be differentiated in two interrelated, yet distinct research fields, 
namely world society research and organizational analyses (Jakobi/Koch 2011). While 
organizational analyses focus on the processes related to organizations and their environment, 
world society is concerned with cross-national and longitudinal analyses of how a common culture 
is disseminated (Meyer et al. 1997a; Drori et al. 2003; Djelic/Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Drori et al. 
2006; Krücken/Drori 2009). Elements of sociological institutionalism theorizing are increasingly 
used by IR scholars, in particular related to research on international organizations, norms and 
legitimacy (e.g. Finnemore 1993; Barnett/Finnemore 1999; Koch 2008). 
Research on world society has a long-standing tradition that first became explicit in the 1970s (see 
also Greve/Heintz 2005). Starting points were the findings of organizational analyses that point at 
the decoupling of actual functions and organizational structures. A similar concept – common 
world trends that impact on the policies and structures of countries – has been used in the world 
society strand of sociological institutionalism (Meyer et al. 1997a). World society represents the 
environment in which nation-states, but also non-state actors like business or non-governmental 
organizations are embedded (Drori 2008: 449). In its basic form, world society research analyses 
thus how international influences impact on nation states and societies. This is often done in cross-
national analyses and by longitudinal data which shows surprising convergence over time, 
irrespective of national conditions (for example Meyer et al. 1997a, 1997b). 
Two different aspects can be distinguished in these studies (Drori 2008: 462-4): One is the 
consolidation of the global that is linked to the rise of global ideas, global institutions or the 
enlargement to world society as important point of reference. The second is worldwide diffusion, 
conceived as the dissemination of world societal ideas and practices. In any of these strands, world 
research analyses a diverse set of cases, ranging from women’s rights, non-governmental actors, 
formal organizations, conflict or science (see Drori et al. 2003; Lechner/Boli 2005; Hironaka 2005; 
Drori et al. 2006). In its totality, research on world society fulfils criteria that are linked to the 
definition of a comprehensive theoretical research program (Drori/Krücken 2009: 5). It is explicitly 
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rooted in American traditions of empirical research, but also has strong linkages to theoretical 
claims prominent in European thinking in constructivist terms (Drori/Krücken 2009: 6). 
However, world society theory is actually a derivate and expansion of institutionalist thinking in 
organization studies. Organizational analyses provided key insights that have later been applied to 
the state world, and later vice versa (Drori 2008: 449). The so-called new institutionalism in 
organizational analyses developed since the late 1970s, against a background of foremost 
functionalist theories and with the idea of an organization as an open system and responding to 
the external environment (Scott 2008: x). From then on, three phases of sociological 
institutionalism can be distinguished: the first, founding years of late 1970s and early 1980s; the 
second phase until the early 1990s; and the third phase of an expanding research agenda from then 
onwards (Greenwood et al. 2008): The foundations of new institutionalism were laid down in 
several articles that newly introduced the idea that organizations correspond to normative 
expectations, in particular if these expectations are linked to rational reasoning, for example 
justifying a better performance (see also Hasse/Krücken 1999). Six most important insights can be 
identified in this phase: Firstly, the institutional and network context influences organizations. 
‘Rationalized myths’ of appropriate conduct represent this institutional context (Meyer/Rowan 
1977). Secondly, while all organizations are subject to these pressures, they impact in particularly 
on organizations that have unclear technologies or outcomes that are difficult to evaluate. Thirdly, 
since organizations seek social approval and legitimacy, and such approval is granted to specific 
organizational behavior, organizations tend to become isomorphic over time (DiMaggio/Powell 
1983). Fourthly, the conformity to external expectations might be at odds with the actual aims of 
the organizations. As a consequence, organizations decouple symbolic structures from the actual 
core of its operations, and the alignment to external expectations therefore remains mainly 
ceremonial. Fifthly, institutionalized practices are typically widely accepted, taken for granted and 
difficult to change. Sixthly, and finally, organizations are embedded in an organizational field, in 
which intense exchange takes place and in which organizational structures are disseminated, either 
due to coercion, due to professionalization and elite interests or through mimesis (Greenwood et 
al. 2008: 6-7). Only slowly, these ideas caught attention, but grew constantly over time.  
In the second phase, research split up to different fields with ongoing interactions. Studies 
analyzed how organizations adopt external models, underlining the rationalization of these ideas 
and their spread across organizational fields. Different kinds of organizations were distinguished 
and their varying responses to the environment examined. The transmission of the external 
expectations and how exactly organizations were influenced also became more important. Finally, 
different cultural environments were compared. New research strands in this phase considered 
agency and interests in institutionalization, institutional change and the consequences of 
institutional behavior (Greenwood et al. 2008: 7-13).  
In the last phase, starting in the early 1990s, institutionalist theorizing has become an established 
perspective in organization studies (Greenwood et al. 2008: 14-21). As a consequence, the term 
‘institution’ multiplied in meanings. One research direction analyzes institutional isomorphism, 
focusing on how and why organizations respond differently to their environment, including 
structural factors, intra-organizational causes, agency and concepts like translation or 
organizational identity. A further strand of research analyzes legitimacy, differentiating different 
forms, different sources and different ways in which it can be acquired Other areas have been 
concerned with institutional entrepreneurship and change, identifying important factors for the 
rise and decay of institutions, and the existence of institutional logics (for example Leca/Naccache 
2006; Leca et al. 2008; Beckert 1999; Thornton/Ocasio 2008). Table 1 summarizes the development 
of sociological institutionalism in organizational analyses over time. It shows that institutionalist 
theorizing started with questions of rationalization, homogeneity, and structural causes, but 
ultimately resulted in diverse research fields, including agency, interests and the explanation of 
change (Greenwood et al. 2008: 23-30). 
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Table 1: The Development of Sociological Institutionalism in Organizational Analyses 
 
 Starting Points
 
1st Phase: 1970s 
 
2nd Phase: 1980s 
 
3rd Phase:  
1990s onwards 
Status  Institutional theory 
as a peripheral 
perspective 
Institutional theory 
as an important 
perspective 
Institutional theory 
as a major 
perspective  
Main 
Issues 
Organizations 
as open systems 
Garbage can 
models 
Institutional context 
influences 
organizations, in 
particular those with 
unclear 
technologies/goals 
Organizations 
construct and 
respond to shared 
meanings 
Establishment of 
conformity 
Adoption and spread 
of models 
Variation of 
responses to 
environment across 
different types of 
organizations 
Cross-national 
comparisons of 
organizational 
responses 
Transmission of 
external influence 
Linkages to other 
theories 
Institutional 
isomorphism 
Variation of 
responses to 
environment due to 
structural factors or 
intra-organizational 
features 
Different sources 
and transmissions of 
legitimacy; different 
acquisitions and 
processing of 
legitimacy 
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
and change 
Institutional logics, 
including conflicts 
Important 
concepts 
 Decoupling 
Taken-for-
grantedness 
Rationalized myths 
Isomorphism 
Organizational field 
Different kinds of 
isomorphism 
Sources of 
institutionalized 
behavior 
Institutional change 
Consequences of 
institutional 
behavior 
Different kinds of 
legitimacy 
Change 
Conflict 
Heterogeneity 
 
 
While sociological institutionalism is rarely covered in its breadth in IR scholarship (but see 
Barnett/Finnemore 1999; Dingwerth/Pattberg 2009; Koch 2009, Lipson 2001), a world society 
perspective has been employed frequently, but with mundane differences (see Meyer et al. 1997a; 
Albert/Hilkermeier 2004). In any of these different understandings, however, world society is more 
than the interstate world. The concept also focuses on the importance of non-state actors, 
transnational relations or the importance of community formation at the world level This inclusive 
perspective does not necessarily result in causal hypotheses on actor influence or outcomes (see 
Albert et al. 2000). Yet from a perspective of sociological institutionalism, world society and the 
role of politics are conceptualized in a very specific causal way, specific processes are emphasized 
and related hypotheses are drawn. The theorization of world society – and, consequently, world 
politics – from this angle is based on three interrelated concepts: the global field, its central units 
and its world culture. A world society perspective does not call for a completely new set of 
important actors in world politics, but it enlarges the focus from nation-states and international 
organizations to other organizations, for example non-governmental organizations, business 
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companies and science, and points at the important relationships between these different groups. 
This interplay of nation states, international governmental organizations and non-state actors is 
part of several analytical approaches (for example Abbott et al. 2010; Albert et al. 2000). Their 
activities and interrelations in a specific issue area turn them into what Avant and coauthors call 
‘global governors’ (Avant et al. 2010): a mix of public and private actors who are actively governing 
a specific policy field. However, world society theorists would argue that global governors are not 
random. Rather, there are similarities in patterns of governance, both across issue areas and over 
time, which can be explored.  
But sociological institutionalism not only conceptualizes world society as a field and its units, it 
also assesses a constitutive culture linked to them (see also Buhari-Gulmez 2010). Following this 
approach, the process of global institutionalization in world society is linked to specific normative 
assumptions, namely a culture deeply influenced by models of functionalism, by causal theories 
and explanations (Lechner/Boli 2005; Boli/Thomas 1999). In consequence, this provides a 
background that makes the acceptance of specific norms and regulations more or less likely 
(Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 907). In this broad understanding, culture refers to the rules that 
constitute society, going beyond questions of taste and morality. Instead, culture lays the 
foundations that determine what we conceive as being an actor or an activity, what social action is 
and what provides the basis of its acceptance. It its most extreme forms, this includes which 
explanations about the world that we are more likely accept than others. Cultural rules form the 
center of a social system, and culture defines the very basis of society and according to this 
understanding, it encompasses both an ontological aspect – linking actors to means and ends – 
and a significatory aspect, relating actors to meaning and legitimacy. More visible regulations, for 
instance property rights or childhood education, are derived from underlying cultural – and often 
unconscious – rules on what seems to be appropriate. In that sense, culture is constitutive (Meyer 
et al. 1994: 17-18).  
The three aspects of field, units and culture are crucial for analyses of world society, and they also 
reinforce each other. For example, given the high legitimacy that units like individuals, 
organizations, nation states enjoy in world culture, they are likely to be central addresses of new 
trends in the field. The trend to increasingly regulate ‘behind-the border issues’ (Zürn et al. 2006: 
16) – setting up international regulations for non-state actors instead of regulating state behavior – 
is one element of a world cultural expansion. Nonetheless, sociological institutionalism shows 
weaknesses in conceptualizing the role of nation states and other actors. They actually appear only 
peripherally as actors in world politics, even if some countries are seen as being dominant in 
specific areas – for example the United States in cultural matters (Meyer et al. 1997a: 164). Given a 
substantial critique on actorhood though (Meyer et al. 1997a: 148-151; Meyer 2010), world society 
theory has not yet put nation states central to world cultural and world political change. This will 
be conceptualized as power in the following, based on institutional entrepreneurship and political 
leadership.  
In that context, the notion of change is particularly important. Powerful actors can bring about 
change in a field or they can stabilize it in a form that serves their interests. Yet explaining change 
is difficult for many theories in IR (for example, Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 888), and in particular 
sociological institutionalist theories, given its emphasis on the binding power of established 
institutions, is foremost concerned with stability. Organizational sociology discusses change in 
organizational fields as institutional change, in combination with institutional entrepreneurship. 
While causal explanations for such change are still rare in world society theorizing, organizational 
sociologists have advanced possible sources for change (Beckert 1999: 779-82). The most 
important one is institutional entrepreneurship, which identifies properties and activities of 
specific field members in bringing about change across the field and among its members. From a 
world society perspective, institutional change is actually an important part of creating a world 
society and is linked to the dissemination of new institutions and the subsequent establishment of 
new regulations and practices, yet explanations of it appear underdeveloped. The following section 
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will elaborate on these theoretical refinements and link them to world society theory and research 
on international relations. 
Power and Change in World Society 
The importance of states in world politics is a truism for IR analysts. In the realist tradition, state 
power has always been the crucial component of global politics (e.g. (Mearsheimer 2001; Drezner 
2007). And independent of the theoretical framework, much research is currently devoted to 
exploring the consequences of a power shift from the West to other countries (for example 
Ikenberry/Wright 2008). While world society theory usually does not to capture such changes, it 
does actually not preclude that countries – as well as other entities – promote different world 
cultural models, indirectly or directly (Meyer et al. 1997a: 164). In much the same way, world 
culture is connected to the hegemonic position of some states over others. As Meyer and 
colleagues state (1997a: 167): ‘Power and interests aside, the cultural styles or tastes of dominant 
actors might readily replicate themselves in global cultural models. Some dimensions of world 
culture […] may fade from world culture when the United States has lost its hegemonic position.’ 
Despite its emphasis on non-power based mechanisms, world society and its culture thus 
incorporates aspects of hegemony and the important role that dominant states play on the global 
level. In this paper, the idea of institutional leadership will be used to conceptualize these links 
between power and world society more closely. Most basically, it means that world society is 
populated by actors that differ in their importance for institutionalization and diffusion, with some 
being more important with regard to leadership than others. In effect, policies based on world 
culture and diffused within world society reflect the approaches of dominant states.  
Institutional Entrepreneurs and Political Leadership 
Political leadership is a constant in international relation analyses and practice. Hegemonic 
stability theory pointed out that hegemons are a necessary part of establishing regimes 
(Kindleberger 1986; Keohane 1984). Political leadership for stimulating cooperation is also an 
essential component of soft power (Nye 1990; Nye 2002). Initially, literature in organizational 
studies had problems in conceptualizing leaders as part of the theoretical framework, and research 
on institutional leadership is a reaction to this problem. Theories based on sociological 
institutionalism usually treat actors as the dependent variable, while relying on macro-structures as 
an independent variable to explain change. It is a major point of critique that the talk of 
organizational fields and of world society elaborates on the internal dynamics, but has only 
partially considered which specific conditions and activities cause such dynamics. Organizational 
theories therefore introduced the terms ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ or ‘institutional leadership’ to 
denote specific actors that bring change, and to bring back actors, interests and power to the study 
of organizational fields (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 198). For world society theorists, this strand of 
research enables a focus on specific actors and their relationship to others in promoting the 
development of norms and policies. By borrowing on the idea of institutional entrepreneurship 
and leadership, the theory of world society can be brought closer to traditional and actor-centered 
IR analyses.  
Many analysts of international relations presuppose the existence of leaders for reaching an 
outcome in international forums (see Lindenthal 2009). Oran Young (1991: 307) elaborated on 
different forms of leadership, referring to individuals and their characteristics in political 
negotiations. But the notion of leadership can also be used more comprehensively and with regard 
to collective actors like states. Leadership is prominent in hegemonic stability theory, which 
assumes that a leader – a country – is needed to provide a global infrastructure that benefits all 
collectively (Kindleberger 1986). Later theorists often presumed that a hegemon acts foremost 
egoistically (see Gilpin 2001; Foot et al. 2003; Krasner 2009). In his work, however, Kindleberger 
did not imply that leaders are necessarily egoistic and establish such infrastructure only when their 
own benefits outweigh their costs; instead it was the unwillingness of the Americans to take 
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leadership costs that he identified as one of the causes of worldwide turmoil. Moreover, leadership 
is also not only bound to military or economic might. In his conception of soft power, Nye shows 
how different forms leadership can be exerted, including the cooperation with other states and 
non-state actors as well as issue-areas like education, culture or science (Nye 1990). In contrast to 
these approaches, however, sociological institutionalism would need to conceive leadership more 
closely linked to surrounding social structures, leadership, thus, is leading a common group, a 
world society, it is not leading ‘external others’. In consequence, sociological institutionalism 
would need a highly relations concept of leadership.   
The idea of institutional entrepreneurs provides a useful starting point for this endeavor: In norm-
related IR research, the idea of an institutional entrepreneur is already reflected in the notion of 
‘moral entrepreneur’ (for example, Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Nadelmann 1990). Institutional 
entrepreneurship was first introduced to organization studies in the 1980s. It refers to the 
‘activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage 
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire et al. 2004: 657). In 
organization theory, the notion represents an important step in institutionalist theorizing that was 
to date foremost concerned with exploring the constraints under which actors operate (Leca et al. 
2008: 3). Given the strong institutionalization effects of organizational fields, change is actually 
highly unlikely and the work of institutional entrepreneurs is therefore to some extent puzzling. 
First, it is unclear how such entrepreneurs can actually envision and implement changes if they are 
deeply embedded in the field. Second, it is difficult to explain how entrepreneurs actually bring 
about changes in the orientation of other field members (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 199). Institutional 
entrepreneurship is thus strongly linked to problems of structure versus agency, given that actors 
who are strongly influenced by the environment change this environment (for example 
Leca/Naccache 2006; Fligstein 2001; Battilana 2006).  
Leca and coauthors (Leca et al. 2008) present several conditions when an actor is likely to become 
an institutional entrepreneur and address how this process unfolds. Field-level conditions refer to 
changes and opportunities that arise from the field, for example through technological change or 
high degrees of uncertainty (Leca et al. 2008: 7-11). The actor’s social position and linkages to 
other field members can also be decisive for entrepreneurship. In fact, ‘existing institutional 
arrangements are a source of power for some people and not for others in a given organizational 
field’ (Battilana 2006: 660). On the one hand, actors on the periphery of a field are more likely to 
innovate given that they are less bound to the fields dominant logic of action. On the other hand, 
central actors usually have more resources and contacts that help to innovate. The status of actors 
is a critical component of institutional change: actors that come from an organization with lower 
prestige or of lower status groups are more likely to be on the margins of the field, which can make 
institutional change very difficult. However, they can overcome barriers through 
interorganizational networking and through networking with higher status organizations, groups 
and individuals (compare Battilana 2006). Actors’ specific characteristics, like social skills and the 
ability to relate to others have been a further important factor in studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana 2006; Fligstein 2001). Social skills include the effective inducement of 
cooperation among diverse actors, agenda-setting with a view to common activities, or the 
persuasion that common interests exist.  
The concept of institutional entrepreneurs provides a framework in which the rise and 
dissemination of policies and norms can be linked to embedded agency. Unlike a concept that 
simply refers to power, literature on institutional entrepreneurship analyzes which activities and 
properties make actors powerful in relation to others. The literature on institutional 
entrepreneurship, however, is quite diverse, and ranges from emphasis of individual ability to the 
positioning in the field. In particular the latter is more closely linked to institutionalist positions 
and underlines ‘the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to see or create ‘a window of opportunity’ 
needs to be considered in relation to the way in which the field produces their interests, skills and 
stocks of knowledge […] (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 202). With a view to institutional 
entrepreneurship in world society, one could thus claim that the collective actor, or state, that aims 
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to change an existing global regulatory framework needs to persuade potential allies. This is 
enhanced by discursive abilities, but also by the position it has in the field. This positioning is 
relative: Scandinavian countries are more likely to be accepted as leaders in issues related to global 
social policy, while the United States is likely to be an authority in military or economic affairs. The 
hierarchy of policy fields – military might usually outruns social cohesion –makes the United 
States intuitively appear more powerful to most IR scholars. Research on political leadership 
therefore needs to start from the field, identifying the potentially important leaders and 
entrepreneurs that have brought about or are about to bring about change. This implies that 
countries and organizations need to be analyzed that visibly attempt to change the field.  
Analyzing Institutional Entrepreneurs 
Institutional entrepreneurship is a collective process. Although power is important, it also involves 
partnerships, cooperation and coalitions, material and discursive interventions (Hardy/Maguire 
2008: 209). Institutional change is a social enterprise, and any activity of an institutional 
entrepreneur or political leader is targeted to a reaction of others. Institutional change is closely 
linked to bringing dynamics to an institutionalized field, but since the field has already established 
specific practices and change does not happen in a vacuum, power is an essential tool in 
institutional entrepreneurship (Beckert 1999). Traditional analyses in IR often rely on military or 
economic capability of states (for example Mearsheimer 2001). In organizational analyses, power is 
based on superior resources, ranging from finance to knowledge or force (Beckert 1999: 792). At 
the same time, power is intrinsically linked to the position of entrepreneurs in the field, being a 
relational concept (Lawrence 2008: 174). In particular the accumulation of social, cultural or other 
capital, following Bourdieu, can enhance the position of an actor and the capability to exercise 
power (Leca/Naccache 2006: 645). In other words, ‘actors do not “have” power; instead, they 
occupy (or fail to occupy) subject positions that allow them to exercise power in – and on – a 
particular field’ (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 201). This exercise of power can be episodic, e.g. in discrete, 
strategic action, or it can be systemic, provided through routines, networks and other relationships 
(Lawrence 2008: 174). Political leadership in world society applies similar mechanisms and is 
intrinsically linked to episodic or systemic relations. Leaders may be outstanding with regard to 
resources and the accumulation of different capital (including social or cultural). If they rely on 
systemic power, they are placed centrally in the field and are linked to many other members of 
world society through membership, networks or informal relations. If they mainly use episodic 
power, they use a particular window of opportunity that makes them powerful at a specific event. 
Both strategies can be combined and make change more likely. 
With regard to strategies applied, institutional entrepreneurship reminds us of other political 
processes: It is accompanied by discursive strategies and mobilizing resources (Leca et al. 2008). 
Discursive strategies, like constructing causal relationships, diagnosing failures or providing 
solutions are essential in that respect. Mobilization is a necessary component of discursive 
strategies, and framing claims need to be done in a way that maximizes cooperation with potential 
allies (Leca et al. 2008: 13). The formation of alliances and cooperation is particularly facilitated 
when entrepreneurs convince others that their ideas are mutually beneficial, or when they can 
present themselves as neutral and acting in the interest of a common good (Leca et al. 2008: 12-14). 
Mobilizing resources is essential for institutional entrepreneurs since they need to overcome initial 
resistance and need to secure support. Tangible resources like financial assets can be used to bypass 
sanctions of other field members, or they can be used to finance initiation of institutions or to 
pressure other members to favor new institutions. Intangible resources like social capital, 
legitimacy or formal authority are important, too: Social capital helps in providing and receiving 
information and support, and it bridges different contexts that might be crucial for institutional 
change. Legitimacy facilitates the perception of and attention given to claims. Formal authority, 
finally, also provides an important avenue to institutional entrepreneurship, given that others 
orient themselves towards formal requirements (Leca et al. 2008: 14-16). Finally, the design of 
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institutional arrangements is a further important element of institutional entrepreneurship, and 
area where the common ground between organization studies and IR is particularly obvious (see 
Leca et al. 2008: 17-18; Wijen/Ansari 2007; Koremenos et al. 2001; Abbott et al. 2000). Institutional 
entrepreneurs try to choose designs that best serve their ideas on change, ranging from formal and 
binding institutions to more informal standards e.g. common in professionalization. 
With regard to world society, we can thus expect leaders to apply discursive strategies like framing 
to push forward a specific policy development. Financial and social resources can be used to foster 
policy development and implementation or by pressuring in networks. Mobilization of like-
minded states, coalition-building, and the initiation of cooperation are part of the strategy in 
institutional change. Finally, legitimacy as well as authority can be used: for example, states can 
point to the normative or legal obligation to overcome obstacles in policy adoption. Institutional 
entrepreneurs have different tools at hand to move the field in their direction. They use 
institutional logics that seem to appeal most to the constituency of the field (Leca/Naccache 2006: 
634). ‘Because institutional fields are arenas of ongoing and shifting power relations that are only 
ever contingently stabilized, institutional entrepreneurship can be seen as the realignment of 
material, discursive and organizational forces around new relations and practices […]’ 
(Hardy/Maguire 2008: 209). 
In particular, collective action frameworks are important for institutional entrepreneurs, since they 
can cause movement around a common issue within the field (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 208). By 
theorization and framing, institutional entrepreneurs devalue the status quo and seek to establish 
alternatives that also resonate with the field members. Claims typically involve both interest-based 
as well as normative claims. Also, sharing ideas and collective sense-making can be part of 
entrepreneurship (Hardy/Maguire 2008: 208-9). Dorado (2005: 390-2) distinguishes three 
strategies – leveraging, accumulating and convening – as sources for change in a field. For 
leveraging, entrepreneurs define the projected change, seek support from others, and afterwards 
bargain for change with dominant actors in the field. In the case of accumulation, change is caused 
by the addition of several, partly interdependent, partly independent activities. They accumulate 
over time, diffuse and are replicated. Convening, finally, implies the creation of interorganizational 
structures in the field that collaborate to bring change. Political leadership has these tools at hand 
too: reference to norms and the appeal to common goals can be used to initiate change. Like other 
institutional entrepreneurs, states can use tools like theorization, framing and the building of 
collective action frameworks to build alliances in the field and to stimulate movement of in world 
society. IR Research has frequently pointed at such processes. For example, securitization processes 
are grounded on these principles, constructing urgency and danger for collective security (Buzan et 
al. 1998).  
The Added Value of Integrating Political Leadership  
The presentation of institutional entrepreneurship has shown many parallels to practice and 
theory in IR research. States and other actors use these strategies like many other institutional 
entrepreneurs, so that political leadership is only one facet of broader institutional change. 
However, the added value of linking political leadership to institutional change and 
entrepreneurship lies in its theoretical closeness to world society research, and in the ability to 
provide a concept that considers actors in a structuralist framework. From the perspective of 
institutional entrepreneurship, we should be able to explain change in world politics by reference 
to actors, but we can incorporate this explanation to world society theory and its emphasis on 
shared expectations and culture. Structure and agency are thus brought together more closely and 
allow us to examine them empirically.  
Including political leadership in analyses of sociological institutionalism is not the repetition of 
what has already been shown in other accounts of world politics. First, institutional entrepreneurs 
and political leaders are not altruists. Instead, institutional change in world society may well be 
motivated by egoistic means-end rationalities. Nonetheless, the procedure how they achieve these 
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ends is conceptualized in terms of sociological institutionalism, which allows a more coherent and 
comprehensive picture of how interests and norms, agency and structure are linked. In 
consequence, sociological institutionalism also is more open to interest-based activities and thus 
more applicable to a broader universe of cases in research on international relations. Secondly, this 
broadening also enables us to use arguments derived from sociological institutionalism when 
questioning the causes of change. So far, institutional change, its extent and its consequences have 
been the main focus of analyses in world society theory. Introducing institutional entrepreneurship 
and political leadership to this theoretical framework allows for more comprehensive explanations. 
For example, we could asses a current wave of criminalization efforts at the international level, 
leading to comprehensive international definitions of criminality, in such diverse areas as 
corruption, money laundering, human trafficking and more. While we can analyze this as norm 
proliferation from a usual perspective of sociological institutionalism, the idea of institutional 
entrepreneurship delivers a focus on political leaders that contribute to this process. Here, the 
United States quickly stands out as being an obvious demander and institutional entrepreneur of 
crime-related regulations (for example Abbott/Snidal 2002). The broadening of the analytical 
framework thus supports the analysis of the rise, diffusion and effects of global regulations. 
Thirdly, from a more practical perspective, the conceptualization of actorhood in world society 
theory is also an important keystone in reaching a comprehensive idea of global public policy as 
domestic policy making of world affairs. World society is then the global community, in which 
specific norms and policies are established. Analyses of successful or less successful strategies may 
then have important consequences for policy makers. 
Exemplifying Entrepreneurship: The United States and Global Crime Governance  
The importance of leadership, also in contrast to hegemony, can be exemplified by the case of 
global crime governance, the attempt to fight crime on the international level and across countries. 
While defining and fighting crime has often been closely attached to the nation state, in particular 
the 1990s have witnessed an unprecedented spread of international, crime-related regulations: 
Early attempts of prohibitions focused on slavery, prostitutions and drugs, nowadays international 
regulations concern such diverse issues as money laundering, corruption, migrant smuggling or 
transnational organized crime in general (for example Nadelmann 1990; Andreas/Nadelmann 
2006; Scherrer 2009). In consequence, new criminalization on the national level has taken place, 
thus translating global regulations to national laws. At the same time, cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies has significantly increased, visible in new agencies like Europol, growing 
mandates of Interpol or bilateral exchange (for example Anderson 1989; Deflem 2006). All in all, 
thus, crime policies constitute a field in which global norms are generated, disseminated and 
change national practices – representing a typical and global institutionalization process in the 
understanding of sociological institutionalism. But while such account would usually point at the 
dissemination of these standards and the convergence of countries over time, incorporating 
leadership also sheds light at the sources of these norms and their implementation. 
A rich literature has repeatedly pointed at the United States as the prominent demandeur of global 
crime policies and their implementation: The country is not only eager to fight crime within its 
borders, but – with the exception of early prohibitions like slavery in the 19th century – the United 
States has taken strong interest in the development of many global policies over time, using 
different instruments to ensure their establishment, dissemination and enforcement 
(Andreas/Price 2001; Andreas/Nadelmann 2006). The leadership of the country is visible across 
issue areas and established by different means. The fight against drugs and the fight against 
terrorism are just two cases in which the United States pressured for regulations, for example 
international conventions against drugs, financing of terrorism or special recommendations issued 
by the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) (for example Gardner 2007). With hard sanctions and 
significant resources, the United States has implemented these regulations, blacklisting countries, 
banks and persons, spraying drug producing areas, and prosecuting suspected terrorists (for 
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example Friesendorf 2007). In fighting human trafficking, the country monitors countries’ efforts 
annually, backed by unilateral sanctions of development assistance for non-compliant countries 
(for example Chuang 2005-2006).  
However, the United States has also used softer and more collaborative instruments to establish 
global crime governance. For example, together with other G7 countries, it initiated the FATF, 
therewith internationalizing American laws against money laundering (for example Gardner 2007, 
Jakobi 2010). The club-organization developed recommendations against money laundering that 
have been revised and extended over time and applied to non-member countries as well (for 
example Tsingou 2010). The FATF has also been supplemented by a network of regional 
surveillance bodies whose task is to ensure implementation of anti-money laundering regulations. 
While the United States is not member of all of them, many of these organizations have been 
supported with financial means, technical assistance and other resources by this country and other 
allies. Also, the United States and partners pushed states to comply with the regional efforts 
(Sharman/Chaikin 2009). With this subsequent enlargement of regulations and the organizational 
structure, combined with strong instruments in the background, a global norm in anti-money 
laundering was established. The United States here clearly provided leadership in 
internationalizing its former national efforts at fighting money laundering, but it did so in 
cooperation with others, and with the pragmatic use of available instruments. The international 
fight against corruption developed in a comparable way. In the 1970s the United States already 
tried to promote international efforts against corruption, but they failed in the United Nations (for 
example Abbott/Snidal 2002; Pieth 1997). When national anti-corruption regulations were 
amended in the 1980s, Congress demanded efforts to establish an international regulation against 
corruption. The US government turned to members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which first only reacted reluctantly. But in the years to 
follow, other OECD members, who were also pressured by civil society actors and ethical 
arguments against corruption, agreed to an international regulation. This first OECD 
recommendation against bribery ultimately lead to the anti-bribery convention (Abbott/Snidal 
2002). Comparable regulations have also been established in other international forums with the 
United States as member or signatory. With a view to law enforcement cooperation, the country 
has expanded its policing across the world, providing education and training for law enforcement 
personnel in other countries (Nadelmann 1993). The country also offers technical assistance in 
setting up crime-related organizational structures, for example financial intelligence units, and 
American anti-crime regulations have also developed as standards in business, even in firms that 
do not need to apply them (Bussmann/Matschke 2008).  
The importance of the United States is not based on military or economic might alone, as 
hegemonic stability theory would pronounce. Surely, economic might helps in setting regulations. 
However, the cooperation with other states and non-state actors in establishing a new normative 
framework has been the more crucial part, enabling a common normative background against 
which enforcement could take place. The expert status of the United States – having a well-trained 
police force and specialists – has supported the central position of the country. Moreover, the 
complexity of crime governance resulted in a global field marked by high uncertainty with regard 
to means and ends, which also reinforced the leadership position of a country that has expertise in 
the field. As institutional entrepreneur, the United States could use financial capital, their linkage 
and importance to other actors (social capital) and the expertise in fighting crime (cultural capital). 
The variation of instruments and approaches to crime governance showed that the country proved 
to be pragmatic, choosing different strategies and forums to pursue its aim of creating global 
norms against crime. In none of these examples, the United States applied brute force based on 
military might, nor would it have been able to establish wide-ranging change without the 
cooperation of others. Partly, countries also have very different takes on crime-related policies, as 
the SWIFT-case and data protection showed. However, by combining different channels of 
influence, building coalitions and linking established instruments from one field to other, the 
United States have ultimately moved the field of global crime governance – representing a core 
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example of successful institutional entrepreneurship. In sum, the United States thus represents an 
important institutional entrepreneur and political leader in this field.  
Conclusions: Leadership, Power and Political Change  
This paper theorized the dynamics of world society, in which the power and activities of political 
leaders are crucial components in bringing about wide-ranging change. In a first step, I identified 
the different strands of sociological institutionalism, showing that it is a rich research tradition 
whose take on world politics ranges far beyond the focus on norms and legitimacy. In a second 
step, I outlined the importance of political leadership for change in world society, derived from the 
idea of institutional entrepreneurship and institutional change. In the third step, the rise of global 
crime governance was briefly presented as a consequence of United States’ leadership. Taken 
together, the concept of world society theory supplemented by political leadership allows for an 
understanding of global policy developments in their broader dynamics, from their rise and global 
manifestation to their cross-national dissemination. At the same time, it points at a complexity of 
relations among actors and the need for cooperation among different actors.  
The idea of political leadership can be an incentive to broader and more diverse research linked to 
sociological institutionalism. Three issues are of particular importance in this context: First, 
research with sociological institutionalism is close to research on networks. The early statements in 
this theoretical tradition already underlined the importance of networks for isomorphism 
(DiMaggio/Powell 1983: 155-6). Showing how political leaders use global networks to bring 
change, which strategies they use and how they craft compromise and cause movement can link 
sociological institutionalism closely to current research on networks in IR (for example Hafner-
Burton et al. 2009). However, not only states and networks disseminate policies, but also 
international organizations. By tackling the question of agency and its strategies, future research 
can analyze how exactly international organizations govern and compare their different 
instruments (see Abbott et al. 2010).  
Second, the analysis of strategies becomes even more complex when linking them to the outcome 
of policy diffusion, in particular patterns of diffusion. To advance the field, actors can chose 
different strategies, including the establishment of different, overlapping regulations, worldwide 
networks or the subsequent hardening already-existent soft regulations (see e.g. Abbott/Snidal 
2000). In combination with the field idea, this can result in specific diffusion patterns. For 
example, hardening international regulations result in different waves of diffusion, depending on 
the actual regulation in place at a given time. When institutional entrepreneurs persuade other 
states in networks, this can result in a more uneven diffusion across countries, depending on where 
the leader is active at a given time.  
A third case in point is the analysis of norm emergence from a state-centered perspective. While 
norm emergence has been most explicit with regard to non-state moral entrepreneurs (for example 
Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore/Sikkink 1998), the idea of political leadership connected to 
institutional entrepreneurship takes into account that norms can be generated by very egoistic 
motives and that governmental actors may have an active interest in advancing the field in a 
specific direction. The different ways in which institutional impact is generated also opens up 
analytical possibilities for studying the influence of countries in world politics more 
comprehensively. Not only influence in negotiations or blunt repression make states powerful 
leaders, but also shaping the field in line with one’s own interests. Such preparatory activities help 
to make claims legitimate and it may help in making the others’ claims appear illegitimate.  
All in all, the incorporation of political leadership into sociological institutionalism thus provides a 
variety of new perspectives on the analysis of current world politics. However, this paper is not 
only a one-way street. For theorists of sociological institutionalism and world society as well, the 
framework outlined provides new and important aspects on the existing body of literature. First, it 
uses the development of organizational theory to complement world society theory and thereby 
brings together strands of research that have a common origin, but have developed differently. 
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Second, it introduced actorhood and variation to the macro-perspective of a homogenizing world 
culture. As such, we can focus on how members of world society try to advance the field in a 
favored direction, but without extracting these actors from a theoretical ‘nowhere’. Third, 
institutional change in world society by leadership opens up the possibility of examining questions 
of power in greater detail. As Greenwood and coauthors (Greenwood et al. 2008: 25) claim, 
institutionalists only have a ‘limited understanding of how power, conflict and fundamental social 
interests affect and are affected by institutional processes’ (see also Lawrence 2008). This 
perspective, finally, enables us to examine a further blind spot of sociological institutionalism, 
namely the use of force linked to institutions. ‘The use of force, and especially of physical force, is 
perhaps the most under-examined aspect of institutional politics in the organizational literature. 
[…] In a broad array of institutional arenas, […], the usage of force by the state or state-sanctioned 
agencies maintains many contemporary institutions.’ (Lawrence 2008: 184). While it is obvious 
that physical force has been a crucial state tool in establishing global institutional change in the 
past, it is unclear to what extent it will be in the future, and which other strategies can be used by 
states to secure an institutional environment that serves their interests. In any case, sociological 
institutionalism has a say in related analyses.    
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